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Among the peculiarities of the Qazaq steppe in imperial Russia was the removal of its Islamic affairs from the general regulatory apparatus of the imperial state in 1868. This adjustment, formalized in the permanent Steppe Statute of 1891, canceled the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly over the steppe and reduced (formal) state regulation of Islam in the region to a minimum. In this paper, I seek to situate the seemingly anomalous character of imperial administration of Islam in the steppe in a broader comparative framework encompassing the Russian Empire as a whole. I seek first of all to establish that many other Muslim populations lacked a regulatory apparatus akin to that of the Orenburg Assembly and thus to emphasize the regionally fractured character of Muslim administration in Russia. Secondly, I compare the removal of the steppe from the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Assembly to a similar exemption of the Buddhist population west of Lake Baikal from the spiritual authority of the Bandido Khambo Lama in 1889. This comparison suggests a more general imperial strategy by the late nineteenth century of separating certain population groups that were considered amenable to Russian "civilization" and perhaps conversion to Orthodoxy (e.g. Qazaqs and cis-Baikal Buriats) away from religions deemed "hostile" to Russian imperial pretensions (e.g., Islam and Buddhism) . This comparative discussion demonstrates the ways in which Qazaq religious experience was both unique in the Russian Empire and reflective of broader patterns.
My contribution rests on the premise that there is much to be gained from examining different regions of the Russian Empire in comparative perspective. Indeed, here I would like to make a larger claim for the significance of comparative analysis within the Russian Empire, which permits us to discern broader patterns in religious experience and modes of imperial rule based on religious institutions.
1 To be sure, many developments depended on local and regional circumstances and even on the outlooks of particular officials, religious elites, and local communities. The dictates of St. Petersburg were frequently altered or transformed in the process of implementation -or ignored altogether. Local initiative -emanating from administrators and subjects alike -was often crucial. From this perspective research on the local, the regional, and the particular will and should always occupy a fundamental place in the production of historical knowledge. Yet I propose that broader logics -based on shared imperial outlooks and bureaucratic cultures, structural similarities between different regions of the empire, and larger imperatives flowing from the empire's necessary engagement with an emerging modernity -were also frequently at work. It is primarily these broader logics that I emphasize here -without, I hope, doing too much violence to the local and the particular.
The years from roughly 1720 to 1860 saw the creation of what I call imperial Russia's multiconfessional establishment of religion. By "establishment" I mean the ordering, regulating and upholding of the ordinances of a religion recognized by state power, as well as the conferring on a particular religious body the status of a state church.
2 It is true, to cite the Law Digest of 1832, that Orthodoxy was the "ruling and predominant faith" of the Russian Empire.
3 Yet it should be noted that in particular regions of the empireFinland, the Baltic region, and the Kingdom of Poland -other religions enjoyed explicit recognition as "ruling" faiths or other marks of preference (though of course never at the expense of Orthodoxy itself). Furthermore, essentially all the recognized non-Orthodox religions of Russia were eventually construed by the government as being state institutions, located under the jurisdiction of the interior ministry (by 1832) and charged with performing significant administrative tasks, such as the maintenance of civil acts. 4 Aside from those in certain distant and recently conquered regions, by the mid-nineteenth century the vast majority of Russian subjects were under the authority of religious bodies which had been created or legitimized by state power and were regulated by imperial statute. These laws and institutions defined the basic parameters of religious life in imperial Russia, and in this regard we may speak of the domestication of the so-called "foreign confessions." This is not to deny that there was much unregulated religious activity, involving Sufis, pilgrimages, and so on. Some of this activity is in fact described by other contributions to this volume.
5 Nonetheless, this regulated sphere of religious activity needs to be included in our consideration, if only because it defined the parameters of the unregulated realm as well.
This process of establishment began with Orthodoxy itself and the creation of the Holy Synod in place of the Patriarch in 1721. Subsequent decades saw the creation of consistories, as well as other measures designed to improve and standardize diocesan administration. This new ecclesiastical bureaucracy permitted stricter and more centralized Church control over local religious life, even though a coherent legal basis for its efficient functioning on the diocesan level appeared only with a statute on consistories in 1841.
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Historians differ about the degree of independence that the Orthodox Church was able to maintain in this process of bureaucratization. It seems fair to conclude that while the Church acquired an absolutized authority over a distinct "spiritual domain" and retained distinct institutional interests, the 4 Buddhists in eastern Siberia were transferred from the jurisdiction of the foreign ministry to the interior ministry only in 1841, while Buddhist Kalmyks were under the ministry of state domains until 1902. 5 Consider also two recent documentary collections dealing with such cases: Marsil' Nurullovich Farkhshatov, "Delo" sheikha Zainully Rasuleva (Ufa, 2009); Diliara Usmanova, Musul'manskoe "sektanstvo" v Rossiiskoi Imperii: "Vaisovskii Bozhii polk staroverovmusul'man," 1862 -1916 gg. (Kazan, 2009 Synod nonetheless evolved into something akin to a government ministry for the Orthodox religion by the nineteenth century.
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While this process occurred more slowly with respect to Russia's nonOrthodox religions, by the mid to late eighteenth century several factors combined to place a premium on institution-building for the non-Orthodox religions. The acquisition of new territories from Poland rendered imperative the assertion of some state control over the affairs of Roman and Greek Catholics, especially in light of papal claims to spiritual authority over those populations. Further eastward, uprisings in 1755 and 1773-75, partly in response to violent missionary campaigns of the 1740s, convinced imperial officials that an accommodation with Islam was essential. This was all the more desirable after the treaty of Küçük KanarcÕ of 1774, which recognized some spiritual authority for the Sultan beyond the borders of the Ottoman Empire, most directly over Muslims in Crimea. 8 Finally, guided by Polizeistaat models of statecraft and Enlightenment conceptions of religious toleration, Catherine's government came to recognize the utility of nonOrthodox religions as sources of order and stability. 9 In this context it was logical for the state to seek to replicate, with appropriate modifications, the institutional and legal arrangement that had been set in place for Orthodoxy earlier in the century.
These modifications were significant, however, and the degree of replication was conditioned by a series of theological, spatial, and (geo)political circumstances that limit our ability to generalize. It is possible nonetheless to assert that in the case of Christian confessions the state sought generally to unite religious affairs under a single institution or religious leader. True, in some cases this authority did not extend (at least immediately) to the Kingdom of Poland or the Grand Duchy of Finland, each of which had its own laws and institutions. But a general tendency towards the concentration of spiritual power is clear. Thus, for example, the state recognized the authority of the Armenian Catholicos over all subjects of the Apostolic (Gregorian) confession within the Russian Empire -and also, for theological and geopolitical reasons, even over that church's adherents abroad. 10 In the case of Roman Catholics, while admittedly trying to dilute the authority of the Pope, tsarist authorities nonetheless formally subordinated bishops within Russia to a single Archbishop and then Metropolitan, 11 and in 1785 extended the authority of that figure even over Catholics of the eastern rite. 12 The affairs of Lutherans were meanwhile concentrated in a General Consistory in St. Petersburg.
This tendency towards concentration was weaker for non-Christian religions. In the case of Jews, despite the creation of a Rabbinical Commission in 1848, it is difficult to speak of any coherent and durable tendency towards spiritual centralization -though there was some limited discussion of this idea. 13 For Buddhists a basic distinction emerged between Buriats and Kalmyks; each received its own statute and spiritual head, while Kalmyks were subdivided even further between Astrakhan' province and the Don Region. For Muslims, too, territorial distinctions were crucial. The Orenburg Assembly was initially established for all of the empire's Muslims, but from the very beginning an exception was made for Crimea, where in due course a 10 In this case Russian statesmen drew both on traditional claims to ecumenical authority on the part of the Catholicos and on its aspirations to use that figure to influence Armenian communities in Persia and the Ottoman Empire. separate muft and spiritual body appeared. 14 When the muft of Orenburg proposed the creation of a central college for Muslim affairs in St. Petersburg in 1804 -presumably on the model of the Roman Catholic Collegethis idea was rejected as entailing an excessive strengthening of spiritual authority over Muslims.
15 Subsequently acquired territories were left beyond the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Assembly. The state furthermore created separate institutional and statutory arrangements for Shias and Sunnis in the South Caucasus, 16 while the North Caucasus featured a particular regime that aspired to restrict the role of Islamic clerics by supporting secular elites and traditional, non-Islamic law. 17 The administration of Muslims was accordingly fractured throughout different parts of the empire, and across the nineteenth century the state expressed growing opposition to any further centralization in this regard. Indeed, government plans for reform of the Muslim administration almost always promoted further fragmentation, even as Muslims themselves frequently proposed greater unity and integration.
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Both Qazaqs and Buriats -my focus in this article -were brought into this general system of administration and indeed were arguably at the fore-14 For the arrangements in Crimea, see Arapov, Sistema, [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] front of its process of creation. As noted, the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Assembly was initially conceived in the broadest possible terms (though of course the largely Muslim regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia had not yet been incorporated into the empire). As a result, the authority of the Assembly and its muft extended well into the Qazaq steppe, and indeed -as numerous historians have noted -the imperial government actually facilitated this extension. 19 In fact, given that the state's first efforts towards institutionalizing Islam occurred in Orenburg rather than in Muslim centers of the Russian interior (for example, Kazan'), and that in staffing the Orenburg Assembly the imperial government drew substantially on figures who had established reputations in steppe diplomacy, one may conclude that the Qazaq steppe was by no means peripheral to the concerns of state actors in establishing the Assembly.
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For several reasons, the situation for Buddhists was somewhat different, although certain similarities are nonetheless discernable. 21 The circumstances here were unusual in that Buddhism was still taking root in the transBaikal region as Russia gradually established its rule there. Even in neighboring Mongolia the kh n had converted to the Mahayana (great vehicle) form of Buddhism of the Gelugpa school -also referred to as "yellow hat" -only in 1578, while the first monastery in Mongolia appeared eight years later. Though there is evidence of Buddhism arriving in the Baikal region as early as the 1660s, the Soviet publication Lamaizm v Buriatii suggests that the first datsan (temple) appeared only in 1707, 22 just as Russia was solidify-ing its control there. After concluding an initial treaty at Nerchinsk in 1689, Russia and China clarified their border and the subject status of the Mongolian tribes in the region in 1727. St. Petersburg now sought to restrict religiously motivated border crossings, and accordingly prohibited the movement of Buddhist lamas across the newly defined frontier. 23 Indeed, the principal goal of the state's religious policy in this region -at least until the midnineteenth century or even later -seems to have involved segregating its new Buddhist subjects from their counterparts across the border in Mongolia, and thus strengthening its claims to dominion in the recently acquired territory.
This aspiration in turn served as the principal catalyst in the state's formal recognition and institutionalization of Buddhism in Russia. Lamas in Russia had initially been dependent on the authority of the Hutagt in Mongolia for initiation and spiritual guidance, 24 but with the solidification of the border Russian authorities were determined to break this connection. In practice this meant encouraging the institutionalization of Buddhism in the trans-Baikal region and conferring prestigious titles on particular individuals who were eager to raise their stature. The goal, in a word, was autocephaly for Buddhism in Russia. Thus already in 1741 -before comparable steps with regard to most other religions and simultaneously with the initiation of a massive missionary campaign in the Volga region that included extensive destruction of mosques 25 -Russian authorities in the region created a registry (shtat) for the "lamaist clergy," and the Tsongol'skii datsan, founded a decade or so 23 24 Hutagt (Russian: Khutukta) = "blessed one," a high-ranking Mongolian incarnated "saint" or huvilgaan (incarnation, or "Living Buddha," often the head of a monastery or temple). The Hutagt in Urga (Mongolia) gained also the title of Javzan damba in 1650 after study in Tibet. The Javzandamba Hutagt was outranked in the Lamaist hierarchy only by the Dalai and Panchen Lamas. On these concepts, see Historical Dictionary of Mongolia, ed. Alan J. K. Sanders (Landham, 1996) , 27, 104, 111. Urga (also Hüree) was renamed Ulanbaator) in 1924. 25 The contrast between the fates of Buddhism and Islam at this moment is highlighted by Nikolai Tsyrempilov, "Za sviatuiu dkharmu i belogo tsaria: Rossiiskaia imperiia glazami buriatskikh buddistov XVIII -nachala XX vekov," Ab Imperio 2 (2009): 107.
earlier, was recognized as the primary temple among Buriats. 26 In 1764, authorities in Irkutsk recognized a certain Damba Dorzha Dzaiaev (Jaya) as Bandido Khambo Lama, 27 which gave him the authority to ordinate people into lower orders. Dzaiaev had been seeking to fend off a challenge for religious leadership from a slightly newer datsan established at Goose Lake in 1741/1758. 28 Although he attained recognition as Bandido Khambo Lama, this struggle for preeminence between Goose Lake and the Tsongol'skii datsan continued for the rest of the eighteenth century and was resolved only in 1809, with the victory of Goose Lake. 29 Buddhism's inclusion in imperial Russia's statutory regime lagged a bit behind the other confessions -not least of all because Buriats were transferred from the jurisdiction of the foreign ministry to the interior ministry only in 1841 30 -but in 1853 Buddhists in Eastern Siberia were accorded their own legal statute akin to those produced for the other "foreign confessions" in the 1830s. Certain parallels with the Muslim case will be immediately apparent. True, Islam had appeared among Muslim communities in Russia earlier than did Buddhism among Buriats.
31 But -in a clear analogy to the Buddhist case -undoubtedly one of the most important reasons for Catherine II's government to establish and/or recognize muft s in Ufa and Crimea was her desire to ensure spiritual independence of Russian Muslims from Islamic figures in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere.
32 Thus the Bandido Khambo Lama and Goose Lake in functional terms played -or at least were designed to play -a role quite similar to that of the muft and the Assembly in Ufa.
Another important similarity -one more directly relevant to the issue in this article -involves those adherents to Islam and Buddhism who were perceived by imperial rulers to be at the margins of their respective confessional communities. Many scholars of the Qazaq steppe now reject the proposition that Islam constituted merely a superficial layer over a "pagan" or shamanist core, in favor of the idea that it formed a deep synthesis with in- even some Qazaq informants -believed that Qazaqs were not (yet) Muslims, that Islamization was still rather superficial, and that effective state interventions could prevent Islam from becoming thoroughly rooted in steppe communities. Imperial policy thus posited a distinction between "true" Muslims (for example, Tatars and sedentary groups in Central Asia) and superficially Islamicized shamanists (Qazaqs). Administrators drew a similar distinction between Buriats in the trans-Baikal region and the roughly similar number of those to the west of that lake, the cis-Baikal. The former were understood to be thoroughly Buddhist, with only small remnants of a foregoing shamanism. The latter offered precisely the opposite image: largely shamanistic Buriats among whom Buddhism constituted a rather superficial layer, if it was present at all.
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To be sure, there are important differences between the two cases. If in the Muslim case the (perceived) degree of Islamization largely coincided with ethnic distinctions (crudely: Tatar vs. Qazaq), then in the Buddhist case the distinction ran through a specific ethnic group -Buriats. This allowed imperial officials to gloss the undesirable Islamization of Qazaqs as "Tatarization," whereas -to my knowledge -there was no comparable term in the Baikal region. Moreover, my impression is that at least in proportional terms far more Buriats than Qazaqs converted to Christianity, at least nominally. Qazaq conversions to Orthodoxy were very rare, whereas a segment of (at least nominally) Christian Buriats had appeared by the mid-nineteenth century, especially to the west of Lake Baikal. 36 For all that, the broad structural similarities between the two cases are significant. Initially (in the eighteenth century) tsarist authorities had sought to integrate adherents to a given religion -Islam and Buddhism -across a large scope of territory. Subsequently, those authorities turned against this policy, rejected it as misguided or mistaken, and sought to segregate certain groups of the respective populations from other Muslims / Buddhists and their centers of religious authority. The reorientation in both cases can be dated roughly to the middle of the nineteenth century and more immediately to the 1860s. This timing was clearly a product, in part, of developments specific to each religion. On the one hand, the end of the Caucasian War in 1864 and especially the conquest of major portions of Central Asia at about the same time suggested the need for a new relationship between the state and its Muslim subjects. Whereas hitherto the inclusion of Qazaqs in the empire's confessional order had apparently promoted their pacification and subordination to imperial authority, after the conquest of Central Asia some statesmen began to fear that this inclusion was enabling the formation of a single and potentially dangerous mass of "fanatical" Muslims extending from the Volga River all the way to the Tian-Shan mountains. Russia's eastward expansion also placed ever more Qazaqs under more direct forms of tsarist authority, which ultimately diminished Islam's utility as an instrument of imperial rule. 37 On the other hand, various Christian missionary efforts among Buriats had by midzakh Steppe, 1881 -1917 ," in: Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia, ed. Michael Khodarkovsky and Robert Geraci (Ithaca, NY, 2001 ): 274-310; and several contributions to the present volume. On the Buddhist case, see Dittmar Schorkowitz, "The Orthodox Church, Lamaism, and Shamanism among the Buriats and Kalmyks, 1825-1925," in: Of Religion and Empire, 201-225 . For an account on the Trans-Baikal region that stresses the minimal success of missionary work, see E. E. Ukhtomskii, O sostoianii missionerskago voprosa v Zabaikal'e, v sviazi s prichinami, obuslavlivaiushimi malouspeshnost' khristianskoi propovedi sredi buriat (St. Petersburg, 1892) . 37 On this reorientation of official attitudes towards Islam (about which there continues to be disagreement), see Crews, For Prophet and Tsar, [192] [193] [194] [195] Russia's Volga-Kama Region, 1827 -1905 (Ithaca, NY, 2002 century laid the foundation for a more determined effort to promote Orthodoxy among them. Thus the first permanent Orthodox missionary station among Buriats was established in 1850, while Irkutsk diocese created two missionary sections in 1863. 38 It was immediately apparent that, especially in the cis-Baikal region where shamanism remained relatively strong, Buddhism represented a major competitor to Orthodoxy and thus an obstacle to the success of these missionary projects.
Yet even larger forces were also in play. The Great Reforms, and in particular their anti-soslovie dimension, implied new modes of integrating the empire's vast territories, by way of powerful (if also nebulous) conceptions of "civilization," grazhdanstvennost', and "Russification" (obrusenie). The January Insurrection of 1863 in the western provinces and Poland rendered this imperative even more pressing and inclined state authorities and conservative publicists to see "separatism" in virtually any aspiration on the part of non-Russian peoples to maintain their particularity. In this context imperial statesmen now paid more attention to those communities and groups which seemed to represent obstacles to achieving greater unity and integration of the imperial polity. Poles undoubtedly were at the top of this list, but Tatars and, somewhat later, Buriats and Armenians also came to occupy prominent places in it as well. It is noteworthy that each of these ethnic groups was related to a distinct non-Orthodox religious tradition -Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, and the Apostolic (Gregorian) confession. Indeed given that the tsarist regime continued to classify people for many administrative purposes by religion, there was a good deal of confusion and overlap in religious and ethnic categories. To the extent that the imperial government had patronized these religions in the previous century or so, many statesmen and observers began to criticize those earlier policies as misguided or mistaken.
For state officials, one of the more distressing attributes of these obstacle groups was the prospect that they would assimilate neighboring non-Russian communities that might otherwise be amenable to Russian influence -for example, Belarusians and Ukrainians in the western provinces and various non-Russian groups (inorodtsy) in the Volga region.
39 Qazaqs and cis-Baikal Buriats should be added to this list.
The reorientation in policy on the steppe has been addressed by a number of scholars, so I shall recount it only briefly here. As we have seen, doubts began to appear among administrators about the degree to which Qazaqs were actually Muslims, based in part on the development of ethnography and the appearance of Russian-educated Qazaqs -most notably Chokan Valikhanov -which cast the steppe in a new light. 40 These doubts drove administrators to reject the pattern of interaction with Muslims established for the sedentary regions to the west (state-sponsored institutionalization of Islam) and to begin favoring customary law over sharia. 41 This reorientation was codified in the (temporary) steppe statute of 1868, which formally terminated the Orenburg Assembly's jurisdiction over the steppe and allowed only one mull -always ethnically Qazaq -for each massive volost'. Those clerics were now subordinated directly to the local civil administration. The temporary statute did not pertain to the Inner (Bukei) Horde, which had been established between the Volga and Ural rivers in the early nineteenth century. Likewise, the Orenburg Assembly continued to have jurisdiction over Tatar inhabitants in the steppe and thus exercised a kind of extra-territorial religious authority. On this, see Arapov, Sistema, 167. rians. The authors of a recent synthetic work on Central Asia assert that the permanent statute of 1891, which replaced its "temporary" predecessor of 1868, reduced the state regulation of Islam even further, "practically to a minimum." 43 Yet Allen Frank argues that a process of "Islamic transformation" of the steppe continued even after 1868, because to a large extent it was rooted in an expansion of the Russian economy into the region -one that continued regardless of specific state rulings about the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Assembly. 44 Examining clandestine "administrative orders" as well as law statutes, Robert Crews detects a gradual reappearance of state supervision of Islam in the steppe, though this oversight seems always to have taken negative forms (surveillance, arrest, etc.). Whether it actually constituted "an Islamic restoration" in the steppe (as Crews' section title would have it) remains unclear.
45 But in any event, it seems safe to posit a fundamental reorientation of state policy on Islam in the steppe in the 1860s, and even Crews, eager to establish broad similarities in the interactions between Muslims and the state throughout the Russian empire, treats this case explicitly as exceptional. This reorientation was rooted in the proposition that the state need not accept that Qazaqs were definitively Muslims (yet) and could perhaps change them into something else instead with the appropriate interventions and manipulation. 46 In the Buddhist case, this reorientation took a bit longer, although even the statute of 1853 -which from one perspective might be construed as signaling the full incorporation of Buddhism into Russia's multiple establishment of religion -seems already to have reflected an important shift. Aside from the fact that the statute imposed extensive limitations on the numbers and activities of lamas and datsans, Nicholas I instructed that it should not be included in the empire's Law Digest (Svod zakonov). This implies, perhaps, that the statute was designed to be temporary -to regulate the affairs of Buddhists only until missionary successes would render such a provision obsolete.
47 Voices more openly critical of earlier policy appeared not long thereafter. When Bandido Khambo Lama Choivan Danzan Eshizhamsuev died in 1859, efforts to replace him immediately ran into difficulties when it turned out that none of the three proposed candidates knew Russian, as required by the statute. State authorities were compelled to appoint an acting Bandido Khambo Lama (Sandeleg Vanchikov), who was later removed for flagrantly ignoring the 1853 statute. 48 In the immediate aftermath of the unsuccessful election -that is, in 1860 -a tsarist official by the name of Haupt was sent to investigate the Buddhist question, 49 and he came to the conclusion that the state's entire policy was based on the erroneous supposition that lamas constituted a "spiritual corporation" -and thus an indispensable soslovie -with particular duties in relation to the laity. Haupt rejected the proposition that the general Buriat population should be regarded as adherents of "the Lamaist faith" simply because most Lamas in the region were indeed Buriat by ethnicity. 50 Arguing that lamas served only as an obstacle to the penetration of Christianity and Russian grazhdanstvennost' among Buriats, he concluded that the government should eliminate the title Bandido Khambo Lama and prohibit lamas from performing any rites (treby) for the laity. 51 The supposition here, in effect, was that only lamas themselves could be considered Buddhists, whereas the laity was something else entirely.
Buddhist "paganism."
53 But when the local Governor-General convened a special committee to discuss the issue in 1865 -just as the Steppe Commission was contemplating the removal of Qazaqs from the authority of the Orenburg Assembly -it proposed only a few insignificant changes and concluded that the 1853 statute remained consistent with the goals of the government. Likewise, complaints of the Orthodox Missionary Society against state policy at the time were dismissed by the government, which instead merely promoted a policy of more strict enforcement of the statute, especially its provisions prohibiting Buddhist "propaganda" among non-Buddhists.
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By the 1880s, however, Haupt's earlier argument, fortified by complaints of Orthodox missionaries, was proving more compelling to the bureaucracy in St. Petersburg. In this regard two circumstances were crucial. First, in 1883 the state had reorganized the administration of Siberia by creating a governor-governorship along the Amur River, which included the transBaikal region. Thus in strictly administrative terms, the Buriat population was now divided between two distinct institutions: one centered to the east of Baikal and the other to the west. 55 This reorganization created certain incentives for the state also to revise the religious authority of the Bandido Khambo Lama, which continued to extend across these administrative boundaries and was now directly subordinate to two separate state authorities. Second, the tsarist government seems generally at this time to have undertaken a review of existing religious statutes with the evident goal of abandoning its earlier policy of institutionalization and patronage for nonOrthodox religions. For Buddhism the central text in this regard was V. Vashkevich's The Lamaists of Eastern Siberia (1885), which insisted on important differences between cis-and trans-Baikal Buriats and proposed the elimination, or at least a fundamental review, of the statute of 1853 -including even the issue of its recognition of the office of Bandido Khambo La- 53 but the interior ministry now conceded that "the attitude of the government towards lamas should be negative." Apparently, there was serious consideration of the abolition of the 1853 statute altogether, but the interior ministry rejected this as an imprudent way of resolving "the difficult question about lamas." Buddhists had evidently got wind of the possibility of impending anti-Buddhist measures, and the resulting agitation, it was feared, might destabilize the border regions with Mongolia. The interior ministry therefore suggested a more modest approach involving the gradual modification of the more objectionable aspects of the statute. The first step in this regard was to terminate the jurisdiction of the Bandido Khambo Lama over the Buddhists of Irkutsk province in 1889 -a jurisdiction that was especially undesirable in light of the much stronger institutional and cultural presence of Lamaism on the other side of Lake Baikal. The experience of many years had shown, the ministry remarked, "that the concentration of power in the hands of one Head Lama alone has given strength and significance to Lamaist propaganda among local pagans and paralyzes the establishment of Christianity among them." A new "temporary instruction" was accordingly produced for the Buddhists of Irkutsk province, which denied them a spiritual leader (aside from the head of each datsan, a shiretui) and also prohibited any contact with foreign clergy, under threat of "resettlement to the most distant places of Siberia. RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, d. 423, 25, 56ob.) .
See also Schorkowitz, "Orthodox Church," 207, who also ascribes this change to the initi-trans-Baikal counterparts in order to make the former safe for Orthodox proselytism. Sources suggest that this was a significant source of dissatisfaction for cis-Baikal Buddhists, who found it extremely difficult to maintain their religious life and institutions while being deprived of contacts with the main centers of Siberian Buddhism east of Baikal. Yet even after the autocracy made promises of religious reform in 1905, their requests for the restoration of the statute and the authority of the Bandido Khambo Lama west of Baikal were rejected or ignored.
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The two cases presented here are notable both for their similarities and differences. Both involved attempts by state authorities to preserve a group of imperial subjects from the negative effects (as they saw it) of dynamic religious and cultural competitors to Russian "civilization" and OrthodoxyIslam and Buddhism. Both involved identifying a particular, seemingly marginal segment of a given confessional community that could be effectively segregated, it was thought, from its core and thus diverted, over the longer term, into a different cultural channel -one more conducive to the long-term interests of the imperial state. A principal difference, however, involves ethnic distinctions. In the case of Qazaqs, the case for segregation could be made by appealing to their emerging national consciousness. Indeed, it is no coincidence that Qazaq critics of Islam, like Valikhanov, were notable in the first generation of an emerging Qazaq nationalist intelligentsia. 60 Thus in the Qazaq case, the group that was to be segregated was -or could at least be construed as -a distinct ethnic community. In the Buddhist case this was more difficult, as the line separating full-fledged Buddhists from only marginal ones needed to be drawn through the Buriat people itself. Thus while the separation of Qazaqs from Orenburg and "Tatar influence" could facilitate their national consolidation, divisions in the Buddhist case would have the opposite effect -dividing one segment of the Buriat population from another.
If we consider the situation in the Qazaq steppe in comparison to wider patterns of imperial rule through religious institutions, we see that this case was in important ways atypical, but by no means utterly unique. By the midative of the chief procurator of the Orthodox Holy Synod Konstantin Pobedonostsev and his circle. 59 See the account sympathetic to Buriats provided by Rybakov in " K voprosu," 18-22. 60 This, for example, is that way that Rottier presents Valikhanov and several others in "Creating the Kazak Nation." nineteenth century, most religious communities in Russia, whatever their religion or confession, were under the jurisdiction of state-authorized religious institutions and legal statutes specifically designed for the regulation of their spiritual affairs. Qazaqs and Buriats fit into this broader pattern from the beginnings of state institutionalization in ca. 1740 to the second half of the nineteenth century. But even when both groups were removed from the religious jurisdictions in question, they joined other groups -Muslims in the North Caucasus, Muslims in Central Asia, "pagans" throughout the empirethat lacked state-sponsored religious institutions. Qazaqs and Buriats were unique in that only in these two cases were populations actually removed from the jurisdiction of established religious institutions and returned to a condition of only rudimentary regulation. That is, if in several cases the state failed to take the process of religious institutionalization to its logical end by incorporating previously unregulated populations, then only in the case of Qazaqs and Buriats did the state actually backtrack and deinstitutionalize particular populations and territories. In my view this act of deinstitutionalization was reflective of a broader aspiration in certain quarters of the state administration to dismantle Russia's multi-confessional establishment in a more comprehensive fashion. But it speaks to the continued utility of these institutions -or at least to the fact that tsarist administrators had nothing with which to replace them -that this dismantling did not go beyond these two groups. On the whole, Imperial Russia's multi-confessional establishment continued to function, even if the Qazaq steppe and the cis-Baikal region were now located on its periphery.
